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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1418 
___________ 
 
PAUL UTAH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STRAYER UNIVERSITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-15-cv-05909) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Paul Utah appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granting a motion to dismiss filed by Strayer University 
(Strayer).  For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Utah filed a complaint against Strayer, which he later amended, complaining about 
his experiences as a student there during the 2013–2014 academic year.  As relief, Utah 
sought six million dollars, a business management degree, a letter of recommendation to 
help him gain admittance to business-related programs at Ivy League schools, and a 
restraining order against teachers and staff at Strayer.  Strayer filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Utah failed to state a claim for breach of contract, harassment, or 
discrimination.  The District Court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and concluded 
that further amendment of the complaint would be futile.  Utah appealed.    
   We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the order granting Strayer’s motion to dismiss.  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  We 
may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 
(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).    
 Utah suggested that Strayer breached a contract because its professors “acted in 
violation of teaching standards” established by the Pennsylvania State Education 
Association.  A student may sue an educational institution for breach of contract “where 
the institution ignores or violates portions of the written contract.”  Swartley v. Hoffner, 
734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).  The contract “is comprised of the written 
guidelines, policies, and procedures as contained in the written materials distributed to 
the student over the course of their enrollment in the institution.”  Id.  Here, the District 
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Court properly rejected the breach of contract claim because Utah failed to identify a 
valid and binding contract that he had with Strayer.  Indeed, Utah did not point to any 
specific and definite contract terms that were violated in his case.  Rather, he merely 
referenced that Pennsylvania State Education Association and asserted that professors 
failed to “help student[s] succeed.”  This conclusory allegation, however, does not enable 
a court to draw a reasonable inference that Strayer was liable for breach of contract.  See 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 Utah also alleged that he was harassed by Strayer professors.  For example, he 
claimed that a professor looked at him in class when “talking about crazy people,” that 
another professor “looked at me and said the word ‘dead’ while teaching,” and that 
professors went to his “gym when they [were] not registered there.”  The District Court 
correctly held that Utah did not state a plausible claim for relief because harassment is 
not an actionable tort in Pennsylvania.  See DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594, 596 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986).  To the extent that Utah sought to bring a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, we conclude that the professors’ conduct was not sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous.  See Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 623 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(noting that “courts have found intentional infliction of emotional distress only where the 
conduct at issue has been atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Utah’s complaint also references Strayer’s use of 
“slanderous information,” but he did not identify any defamatory communications.  See 
Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing elements of a 
claim for defamation under Pennsylvania law). 
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 Utah also included allegations of “[d]iscrimination and profiling.”  In support, he 
alleged that “[t]he campus thought [he] was just an underachiever student,” that Strayer 
“thought that [he] did not want his degree as much as he wanted it,” and that a professor 
“did not give [him] the same opportunity [as other students] to take [a] quiz” after he 
arrived for class “a few minutes late.”  None of these allegations, however, establishes 
that Utah was a member of a protected class or that he was treated differently than 
similarly-situated individuals.  See Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“Although the prima facie elements of a discrimination claim vary 
depending on the particular facts of the case, the plaintiff must generally present evidence 
that ‘raises an inference of discrimination.’”) (citations omitted); see also Bell v. Ohio 
State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that dismissed student alleging 
discrimination must provide evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) 
she suffered an adverse action at the hands of the defendants in her pursuit of her 
education; (3) she was qualified to continue in her pursuit of her education; and (4) she 
was treated differently from similarly situated students who are not members of the 
protected class).  Finally, in light of the nature of the allegations set forth in Utah’s 
amended complaint, which at times border on the frivolous, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that allowing him leave to amend his 
complaint would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 
